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ON THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF RISK OFFICER AND THE RISK 
COMMITTEE IN INSURING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
AGAINST LITIGATION 
Arash Amoozegar 
 Can Chief Risk Officers (CROs) act as insurance against litigation risks in 
financial institutions? In most financial institutions, CROs and their risk management 
staff fulfill a key role in managing risk exposures, yet their lack of involvement in the 
governance of banks has been cited as an influential factor that contributed to 
management team failure and the financial crisis of 2007-2008. A variety of legislative 
and regulatory bodies have pressured financial firms to improve their risk governance 
structures to better weather any potential future crises. Assuming that CROs are indeed 
given sufficient power to influence the corporate governance of financial institutions, can 
they provide these firms with the promised benefits? To partially answer this question, 
we consider one of the final outcomes of risky behavior: shareholder litigation. By 
comparing the risk governance characteristics of sued firms with their non-sued peers, we 
show that proper risk governance reduces a firm’s litigation probability. We accomplish 
this by using principal component analysis and by constructing a single measure that 
captures various aspects of risk management in a firm. In addition, we show that the 
addition of our risk management factor to models that have been previously proposed in 
the literature improves the accuracy of those models in identifying companies that are 
most susceptible to class action lawsuits. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Risk is chemistry, it’s not particle physics. You cannot separate the risks.” 
Mikes (2010) 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 put a spotlight on the risk management practices 
of financial institutions. In the aftermath of the crisis, academics, regulators, and 
practitioners alike have raised concerns regarding the role and authority of risk officers in 
the hierarchy structure and decision-making process of financial institutions (Kirkpatrick, 
2009). The Basel Committee (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012) and the 
Institute of International Finance (Green and Jennings-Mares, 2008) are among many 
regulatory authorities and industry groups that have requested improvements in the risk 
oversight by financial institutions. 
Since its inception, the so-called Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) system has 
evolved into the standard tool through which organizations manage their vast risk 
exposures and try to seize opportunities. Naturally, it has become the focus of many 
practitioner and academically oriented discussions in recent years. Many organizations 
have started to realize the value and importance of ERM and are taking measures to 
implement it into their business. Universities and various certification bodies have 
devoted specialized educational programs for this emerging field. Similarly, consulting 
firms have responded to the heightened number of requests by their customers by 
establishing specialized consulting units. Finally, rating agencies have incorporated ERM 
assessments in their company evaluation process. Given these developments, it is 
apparent that the financial and non-financial industry as well as regulators and academics 
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put a lot of importance on a correct view towards risk and its management. Yet, despite 
this welcome attention, the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of enterprise 
risk management in better insuring an organization against hazards and better equipping 
it with appropriate tools for benefiting from opportunities is lagging behind (Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2011). 
This study aims to fill this gap in the financial literature by examining the 
effectiveness of appropriate risk management structures and in insuring companies 
against shareholder litigation. Our main proposition in this study is that institutions that 
have a good understanding of risk and its management are more prudent in their activities 
and will not expose themselves to excessive risks, and if a risky situation arises – as it 
always does in today’s volatile markets – these institutions should be well-equipped to 
identify them and take appropriate actions before hedging these risks either becomes too 
expensive or impossible. We are interested to see if there is a significant difference in the 
propensity to be sued between financial institutions that have implemented a strong and 
independent risk management function in their business and ones that do not share the 
same holistic view towards risk and risk management and instead engage in isolated risk 
management practices. 
Some readers may wonder why we only focus on financial institutions. What 
makes the risk management function in these firms special? Risk taking and risk 
managing is part of the day-to-day business of financial institutions. The complexity of 
their operations exposes these institutions to a variety of risks. In addition, because many 
financial institutions engage in different business lines – many of which are not directly 
related to banking – they have a more complex risk profile that is considerably more 
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difficult to manage. Despite legitimate demands and pressures from regulators and 
market participants, the evidence presented in recent studies reveals that risk management 
has a relatively low priority in these institutions even though their primary concern 
should be what risks they are facing and how they can effectively manage them. Valukas 
(2010) provides a case study of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and shows that the firm’s 
senior management team ignored its risk limits and disregarded the red flags pointed out 
by its senior risk officers. In his article, Scott (2011) notices the negative correlation 
between the rank of the person in a company and his understanding of the actual business 
of the firm. In addition, he points out the “absurdity” of firing the company’s senior risk 
officer in a usual downsizing. By focusing our attention on financial institutions, we want 
to see whether we can support our proposition that a designated risk management 
function may serve as an insurance tool against litigation.  
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, our study shows that effective 
risk management practices indeed provide litigation insurance to the firms that implement 
them. Second, this study contributes to the growing strand of studies that focus on 
industry-specific corporate governance practices and more specifically on the corporate 
governance of financial institutions. Similar to Ellul and Yerramilli (2012), we 
differentiate our work from other corporate governance studies by focusing on 
appropriate ex-ante remedies rather than ex-post remedies. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review 
of the related literature. Section 3 provides an overview of the matching method and 
principal component analysis technique employed in this study. Section 4 outlines our 
data sources and defines our variables. Summary statistics and multivariate analysis 
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results are reported in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 compares the predictive ability of 
models with and without a risk management factor. Section 8 presents different 
robustness tests. Section 9 summarizes our findings and concludes while Section 10 
proposes some possible venues for future research.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our study relates to several strands of research that explore the risk management 
in financial institutions by examining the impact of Enterprise Risk Management and the 
role of CROs in a firm’s risk governance structure.  
Ertugrul and Hegde (2009) explore whether rating agencies can identify firms that 
may be affected by governance issues in the future. Specifically, they employ probit 
regressions to examine whether ratings by The Corporate Library (TCL), Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), and Governance Metrics International (GMI) can predict 
governance failures and potential future lawsuits. They document that overall ratings 
have little predictive power with respect to litigation likelihood, yet when they run tests 
on sub-ratings instead of overall ratings, they find that firms equipped with more 
shareholder friendly boards, a favorable litigation history, and some positive adjustments 
for capturing factors that cannot be included in the rating agencies’ normal scoring 
scheme have a reduced likelihood of being sued.  
Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) construct their own Risk Management Index (RMI) to 
evaluate whether an independent and strong risk management structure lowers the 
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enterprise-wide risks in bank holding companies (BHCs). They hand-collect risk 
management data for the 74 largest BHCs and show that BHCs with a high RMI rating 
had a lower downside risk during the recent financial crisis. Expanding their analysis to 
the period 2000-2008, they show that the positive effect of strong risk controls is not 
limited to the crisis period and argue that, regardless of the economic climate, a proper 
risk management function will be effective in aligning a bank’s behavior with its risk 
appetite. 
Even though corporate governance indicators are frequently used as performance 
predictors, Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2011) show that these measures did not have any 
significant positive effect on banks’ performance during the recent crisis. In contrast, they 
find that bank performance during this turbulent time can be explained by the banks’ risk 
governance power structure as proxied by such factors as the risk committee and the 
CRO’s line of reporting. This finding suggests that standard corporate governance 
measures cannot properly describe banks’ atypical governance structure. In the same 
vein, Adams and Mehran (2002 and 2003) document significant differences between the 
board characteristics of BHCs and unregulated manufacturing firms and their effect on 
performance. Their findings further illustrate the specificity of board structure and its 
importance in the banking industry. 
Even though the role and power of CROs in the corporate governance of financial 
institutions have become a subject of scrutiny following the two recent financial 
meltdowns, improvements in this area are still limited and a lot of work remains to be 
done. Mongiardino and Plath (2009) review the governance structure of large banks and 
note that even though these banks are involved in very complex operations and hold 
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financial products that expose their balance sheet to a wide variety of risks, not all of 
them have a dedicated CRO with lines of reporting according to the industry’s best 
practices or a dedicated risk committee. In many large banks, the risk-related 
responsibilities are given to audit committees which may be overburdened, causing the 
banks to compromise the risk management responsibilities.   
The lack of a CRO’s authority in a bank’s governance structure, the inappropriate 
reporting lines of CROs, and the infrequency of risk management meetings are cited in 
various reports as contributing factors to the management failures in the recent crisis (see, 
for example, reports by the Bank for International Settlements (2009) and the Senior 
Supervisors’ Group (2009)). 
Many of the recommendations provided by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision call for a better organizational structure with respect to risk management in 
the banking industry. In this study, we incorporate these recommendations into our 
analysis framework in order to assess the appropriateness of the risk management 
function. Pezier (2010) summarizes these recommendations into four general areas: 
 Active involvement of the board of directors and the management team in 
risk management oversight; 
 Independent functionality and sufficient resources at its disposal; 
 Regular reporting to the board of directors and the management team; and 
 Proper documentation and audits of the risk management processes. 
In this study, we propose several proxies for identifying the existence of each of 
these recommendations and assess their impact on the probability of a financial 
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 This section introduces the matching methodology we employ in this study. First, 
we discuss the need for matching and its importance in this line of research. Next, we 
provide a detailed discussion of our matching procedure and of its advantages and 
drawbacks compared to other popular methods in the literature. Finally, we explain our 
approach for arriving at a single risk management factor while accounting for most of the 
variance in our underlying risk management proxies.  
 Matching Procedure 
Since specific data for CRO-related characteristics and, on a broader scale, most 
of the risk management related data is not available in any commercial database, we 
manually collect them from company statements filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Hand-collecting the same information for the universe of non-sued 
institutions in our control group is not feasible. This is where matching comes in to play 
in our methodology.  
We draw on Faulkender and Yang (2010) and Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2011) who 
review and discuss the suitability of different matching methods that are frequently used 
in the finance literature. In corporate governance and banking context, Faulkender and 
Yang use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to show that compensation committees 
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choose companies with higher-paid CEOs as their compensation peer groups in order to 
have a justification for their CEO’s compensation package. The authors control for 
different firm characteristics and find that CEO compensation is highly significant in 
determining the probability of a firm being chosen as a potential compensation peer. 
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2011) choose a matching technique which they claim helps 
overcome selection biases present in previous studies and provide evidence in favor of an 
increased profitability of acquired banks in Central and Eastern Europe in a three-year 
window after their acquisition.  
 We employ two criteria as part of our matching procedure, namely a firm’s 4-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and the natural log of its market value one 
year prior to the litigation date. Using SIC codes as a matching criterion is a natural 
choice since it enables us to compare financial firms that are in the same line of business. 
We use 4-digit SIC codes in our study since the characteristics of corporations in these 4-
digit categories significantly differ. For example, financial institutions in SIC code 6021 
are nationally chartered banks while those in SIC code 6022 are state chartered.1  
Employing the natural log of market capitalization as our second matching factor 
ensures that matched companies are of approximately similar market size and hence 
comparable. The natural log of market capitalization is calculated by taking the natural 
logarithm of the product of the firm’s closing price and its number of shares outstanding 
at the end of its fiscal year. Since the distribution of firm size is highly skewed in our 
sample, we use the natural logarithm of this measure.  
                                                 
1 The five groups of SIC codes used in our study are as follows: 6021 (national commercial banks), 6022 
(state commercial banks), 6029 (commercial banks, NEC), 6035 (federally chartered savings institutions), 
and 6036 (not federally chartered savings institutions). 
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 Principal Component Analysis 
 As we will discuss later, we consider several main variables of interest in our 
regressions to proxy for different aspects of risk management and the CRO’s power and 
influence in financial institutions. This process could potentially lead to the inclusion of 
highly correlated variables in our model. In order to alleviate this problem we will 
employ the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique and develop an artificial risk 
management variable (RM) that accounts for most of the variance in our main variables 
of interest. Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) use the same methodology to create their Risk 
Management Index (RMI) while Callahan, Millar, and Schulman (2003) construct a 
“management participation index” by employing this technique. Some of the variables we 
use in our study are similar to the ones included in the RMI while others are new or are 
calculated using different methodologies.2  
 We believe that principal component analysis not only helps us eliminate the 
correlations in our independent variables and remove some of the redundancy in related 
variables, it also relieves us from making subjective decisions about the inclusion or 
exclusion of each independent risk management variable in our regression models 
(Tetlock, 2007). Aside from these advantages, the principal component analysis 
technique allows us to take a holistic view towards the risk management in a company. 
Instead of looking at different variables and their effects individually, we consider them 
as one single measure which is affected by all the risk management variables and 
accounts for most of the variation in independent variables. Specifically, we choose the 
                                                 
2 The authors tried to get access to the data underlying the Risk Management Index by contacting Andrew 
Ellul. When we initiated the contact, Ellul and Yerramilli were in the process of “extending the RMI 
measure to a larger number of banks and going back to 1994”. Thus, we could not use the RMI in our 
study. 
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principal component with the highest eigenvalue as our artificial variable of choice. We 
use the PROC FACTOR procedure in SAS to perform the principal component analysis 
and use the resulting risk barometer to assess the effectiveness of each firm’s risk 
management and risk governance. 
 The first principal component is considered to be the “best linear function of the 
related variables that summarizes the variation” (Callahan, Millar, and Schulman, 2003). 
The principal component analysis technique is devised in such a way that the first 
component accounts for the highest level of variation in the underlying factors. In our 
study, the first component captures 65% of the total variation in the variables and because 
the other components contribute marginally to the explanation of the total variance, we 
only consider the first component as the risk management factor in our analysis. Contrary 
to Ellul and Yerramilli (2012), who find that the proportion of CRO’s total compensation 
to the CEO’s total compensation is the most important underlying variable in the risk 
management index, we notice that the CRO c-suite dummy variable is the component 
with the highest score in our principal component analysis. 
 
4. DATA AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 Data Sources 
To construct our sample of financial institutions that were involved in a lawsuit, 
we searched the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) website3 for all class 
                                                 
3 Accessible at: http://securities.stanford.edu. 
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action lawsuits filed under the Securities Act of 1934 against financial service firms 
during a 16-year period from 1996 to 2011.4 This database is maintained by Stanford 
University and provides information for 3,567 securities class action lawsuits during that 
time period. We implement multiple filters to form our final sample:  
First, since we are only concerned about litigation against financial institutions, 
we only consider lawsuits against firms that operate in this industry. This reduces the size 
of our sample to 641 cases. Next, we filter our sample by only including firms that trade 
on one of the three major stock exchanges, i.e., the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ), and 
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). This step reduces our sample size to 518.  All 
other cases involve firms that trade in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, as pink sheets, 
or were privately held at the time of the litigation.  
Finally, we exclude cases that are filed under the 1933 Securities Act and allege 
security law violations in connection with initial public offerings (IPOs) since these cases 
have drastically different characteristics and because we require the companies in our 
sample to have information on different firm characteristics for at least three years prior 
to the filing date. Imposing this restriction reduces the size of our final sample to 432 
observations. Table 1 provides yearly summary statistics for our sample.  
As can be seen in Table 1 column 2, the number of class action lawsuits peaked in 
2008 (with 79 cases) and in 2007 (with 43 cases), likely as a direct consequence of the 
                                                 
4 I am indebted to Dr. Thomas Walker for granting me access to a hand-collected dataset of securities class 
action litigation cases. 
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financial crisis. Afterwards, the number of cases started decreasing, reaching 14 cases in 
the final year of our sample. 
Our sample of financial institutions includes a wide array of financial companies 
ranging from insurance companies and financial advisory firms to commercial banks and 
real estate corporations (with SIC codes in the range from 6000 to 6999). As noted 
earlier, we focus our attention on a subset of firms that specifically operate in the banking 
industry (with SIC codes of 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, and 6036). Implementing this 
requirement reduces our sample significantly and leaves us with 119 litigation cases.  
The specific data requirements of our study limit our sample and control group to 
firms that are covered by the Compustat and CRSP databases and that have the necessary 
financial data to calculate our variables for at least three years prior to the lawsuit filing 
date. This requirement reduces our sample size to 85 firms. Therefore, our complete 
dataset contains 85 observations for sued firms and 85 observations for their matched 
peers. Because we do not have any observations for the years 1996, 1997, and 1998, the 
final sample of our study contains lawsuits during a 13-year period from 1999 to 2011.   
Table 1 column 3 presents the number of litigation cases against financial firms 
with banking operations that are included in our final sample. The numbers show a trend 
that is similar to that for the entire financial industry. More specifically, the number of 
lawsuits peaked in 2008 with 18 cases and after that we see a gradual decrease to 8 cases 
in the final year of our sample.  
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of litigation cases for each of the 
four-digit SIC codes in our sample. Financial firms in the SIC codes 6021 (national 
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commercial banks) and 6022 (state commercial banks) comprise most of our sample 
which is similar to the proportion of the firms from these groups in the entire financial 
industry sample.  
The violations cited in the litigation case summaries vary significantly in our 
sample but similar to Peng and Röell (2008) we are able to classify them into two distinct 
categories, namely (1) firms sued for allegedly engaging in fraudulent behavior, and (2) 
firms sued for providing material misinformation in their public statements. We 
hypothesize that firms that empower their CRO will reduce the likelihood of fraudulent 
behavior across the firm. Certainly, this form of litigation insurance is not free of charge. 
As Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2011) point out, implementing a more rigid risk 
governance structure can lower the performance of banks during non-crisis market 
conditions.  
 Unfortunately, there are no laws or industry regulations that require firms to 
disclose their engagement in enterprise risk management or their risk governance 
practices. To overcome this challenge, we hand-collect all risk management data from 
financial reports available in the SEC’s Edgar database. These reports include 10-K 
statements, proxy statements, and annual reports. For the purpose of this study, more than 
1,000 annual reports and proxy statements have been analyzed to collect the required 
data.  
The daily stock price data for all firms in our sample including the firms in the 
control group and the S&P 500 index are collected from the Center for Research in 
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Security Prices (CRSP). In addition, we collect data for the put option implied volatility 
(used in the calculation of our downside risk measure) from the OptionMetrics database.  
 Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in our regressions is a dummy variable that captures 
whether or not a financial institution is the target of a class action lawsuit. We assign a 
value of one to all firms that have been sued during our sample period (SUED = 1) and a 
value of zero to their matched peer firms (SUED = 0).   
 Risk Management Variables 
To test our hypothesis, we define a series of variables that will help us measure 
the CRO’s power and independence in a financial institution’s corporate structure. To 
accomplish this, we look at the presence of a designated CRO, his power and degree of 
independence, and the responsibilities that are designated to him within the firm’s 
organizational hierarchy. In addition, we capture whether the firm has a designated board 
committee that is responsible for overseeing the firm’s risk management, assessment, and 
mitigation and its characteristics as another venue of enforcing and implementing the risk 
management and control functions in a firm.  
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) point out that only factors that are not affected by 
the treatment should be considered when choosing variables for inclusion in logit 
regression models. In order to guarantee that our chosen variables are not influenced by 
their participation in the treatment group, we measure them one year before the 
participation year, i.e., the year of litigation. 
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Keeping the above-mentioned point in mind, we collect CRO-related data for 
each of the three years prior to the year in which the litigation took place. There are two 
reasons for choosing a three-year pre-litigation window for our data collection. First, we 
believe that three years provides a period that is long enough for senior risk officers to 
implement their desired strategies or correct inaccuracies as they see fit. Second, the 
extensive work effort that is required when manually collecting and validating data 
deterred us from considering longer periods. The following is a thorough description of 
the risk management variables employed in our study: 
CRO c-suite: this dummy variable takes on a value of one if the financial 
institution’s CRO is an executive of the firm (SUITE = 1) and zero otherwise (SUITE = 
0); 
CRO compensation: when performing their principal component analysis, Ellul 
and Yerramilli (2012) notice that the ratio of the CRO’s compensation to the CEO’s 
compensation is the most significant variable in their risk management index. This 
variable acts as a proxy for the CRO’s power and influence in the governance structure of 
the firm. To complement our hand-collected compensation data, we use the Compustat 
ExecuComp database. Unfortunately, because public firms are only legally obligated to 
disclose the compensation packages of their top five executives, we were not able to find 
information about the CRO’s compensation package for all firms in our sample. To 
circumvent this problem we take an approach similar to the one proposed by Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2012). Specifically, we subtract a percentage point from the ratio of the 
compensation package of the fifth highest paid executive to the CEO’s compensation and 
consider this as our CRO compensation proxy. Contrary to Ellul and Yerramilli (2012), 
16 
we do not define an imaginary CRO compensation package for firms that do not have a 
CRO position in their corporate structure. This variable is defined as the ratio of the 
CRO’s total compensation package to the CEO’s total compensation package (COMP); 
CRO experience: this dummy variable takes on a value of one if the financial 
institution’s CRO has risk-related experience (XP = 1) and zero otherwise (XP = 0); 
CRO reporting: this dummy variable takes on a value of one if the CRO has a 
direct reporting line to the board of directors (REP = 1) and zero otherwise (REP = 0); 
CRO tenure: we define CRO tenure variable as the number of years since the 
CRO was in his/her position (TEN); 
CRO top5: this dummy variable takes on a value of one if the financial 
institution’s CRO is one of the top five paid executives of the firm (TOP5 = 1) and zero 
otherwise (TOP5 = 0); 
Risk committee: this dummy variable takes on a value of one if there is a 
designated committee among the firm’s board committees that is directly responsible for 
managing and monitoring the risk functions in the firm (COMMITTEE = 1) and zero 
otherwise (COMMITTEE = 0). Contrary to Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) we distinguish 
between committees that are exclusively responsible for risk management and 
committees that have risk management responsibilities combined with their main 
functions (e.g., an audit committee). By incorporating such restrictions, we follow the 
recommendation of Mongiardino and Plath (2009) who argue that overburdening the 
audit committee will push risk functions into the shadows and might thus hamper the 
desired outcome of these functions; 
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Risk committee experience: this dummy variable takes on a value of one if at least 
one of the directors of the risk committee has risk management related experience 
(COMMITTEE_XP = 1) and zero otherwise (COMMITTEE_XP = 0). Contrary to Ellul 
and Yerramilli (2012), we are only interested in the risk management related experience 
of board members and not in broader aspects such as “banking experience” or “financial 
experience”;   
Risk committee meetings: the risk committee meetings variable is defined as the 
number of risk committee meetings throughout the year (COMMITTEE_MEET). 
As previously mentioned, we employ principal component analysis to construct a 
risk management factor. Specifically, we construct two different versions of this factor. 
First, we only calculate the risk management factor based on the data for one year prior to 
the year of litigation (RM_1Y). Accordingly, only the accounting and financial variables 
of that year will be included in our models. Second, we consider the three-year average of 
the risk management factor (RM_3Y) as our variable of interest. We calculate the risk 
management factor for each year and then calculate the three-year average. Accordingly, 
we include the three-year averages of all accounting and financial variables in the models 
with the three-year average of the risk management factor.   
 Control Variables 
We control for various characteristics of financial institutions that may potentially 
affect the dependent variable in our proposed regression analyses. The extant literature on 
litigation risk has identified several variables that affect the probability of a firm being 
sued. These characteristics include: the firm’s profitability, its enterprise-wide risk 
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characteristics, share turnover, past volatility, stock returns, the total number of shares 
held by the CEO, the litigation history of the firm, and the percentage of CEO 
compensation from bonuses. The following is an explanation of our control variables: 
Accruals: we employ two definitions of accruals ratio (ACC) in our study. The 
total accruals ratio (ACC_TT) is defined in as the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items minus operating cash flows minus cash flows from investment divided by total 
assets. We also consider operating accruals which is defined as the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items minus operating cash flows to total assets (ACC_OP). Peng and Röell 
(2008) employ the accruals ratio as a proxy for overstatement and manipulation in 
financial statements and report a significant positive impact of this variable on litigation 
probability; 
Auditor: prior studies (e.g., Raman and Wilson (1994)) provide evidence that 
suggest that higher quality audit reports prepared by the big four accounting firms (in 
order of latest revenue figures: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
Young, and KPMG) may provide some form of guarantee for the accuracy of the firm’s 
financial statements. On the other hand, because auditors of sued firms can be held liable 
alongside the firm itself, the deep pocket theory suggests that the presence of big 
multinational accounting firms may attract more litigation (Alexander (1991); 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004)). To test the validity of these prepositions, we 
use the auditor code in the Compustat dataset to identify the firm’s auditor. If the auditor 
is one of the big four audit firms then we assign a value of one to the auditor dummy 
variable (AUD), otherwise the auditor dummy is equal to zero. In our three-year average 
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regressions we assign a value of one to the auditor dummy when the firm’s auditor was 
one of the big four audit firms in all three years; otherwise the auditor dummy is zero; 
CEO compensation from bonuses: the CEO compensation from bonuses variable 
(BON) is the ratio of the CEO’s bonuses to the CEO’s total compensation (defined as the 
sum of salary, bonuses, other annual compensation, restricted stock grants, and the value 
of options exercised). We also calculate another variation of the CEO’s compensation 
from bonuses variable by dividing CEO bonuses by the CEO’s total current 
compensation defined as the sum of salary and bonuses. Gande and Lewis (2009) argue 
that higher proportion of bonus compensation for the CEOs can provide enough 
incentives for them to have a better performance and, consequently, mitigate the litigation 
probability of the firm. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between the percentage 
of the CEO’s compensation from bonuses and the firm’s litigation likelihood; 
Enterprise-wide risk characteristics: Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) show that firms 
that were better positioned in terms of their risk management experienced lower levels of 
enterprise-wide risks during the 2007-2008 crisis. By including these risk measures in our 
regressions we aim to explore whether the enterprise-wide risk characteristics of financial 
institutions affect litigation probability. Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) we use 
three different risk metrics to proxy for enterprise-wide risk (ENT): aggregate risk, tail 
risk, and downside risk. Aggregate risk (ENT_AGG) is the standard deviation of the 
financial institution’s weekly return minus the S&P 500’s weekly return over the year. 
Tail risk is calculated in two different ways. Under the first method, tail risk 
(ENT_TAIL_I) is defined as the negative of the financial institution’s average return 
during the 5% of days on which the S&P 500 recorded its lowest returns. Under the 
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second method, tail risk (ENT_TAIL_II) is calculated as the negative of the average return 
of each firm in our sample during the 5% of days on which the stock itself recorded its 
worst performance over the year. Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) implement this second 
definition in order to make sure that their risk measure is not solely capturing the return 
of the S&P 500 index. Lastly, downside risk (ENT_DOWN) is the average implied 
volatility of the put options traded on the stocks of each firm in our sample. The data for 
the put option implied volatility is collected from the OptionMetrics database; 
Fixed effects: in all our models we include year fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects (FE) as dummies to control for the effects these variables may have in our models. 
For brevity, the regression coefficients for these variables are not reported in our tables. 
Institutional ownership: the institutional ownership variable (INST) is the ratio of 
the number of shares held by institutional shareholders at the end of the year to the total 
number of shares outstanding. We retrieve the institutional holdings data from the 
Thomson Financial database which provides information on the holdings of all 
institutions that are legally obligated to file form 13F with the SEC and have more than 
$100 million assets under management. These institutions include bank trusts, insurance 
companies, investment companies, investment advisors, pension funds, and endowments. 
Similar to Kim and Skinner (2012), we expect this variable to have a positive effect on a 
firm’s litigation risk; 
Leverage: we employ two different definitions of leverage variable (LEV) in our 
models, namely book leverage (LEV_B) and market leverage (LEV_M). Book leverage is 
defined as total assets minus the book value of equity divided by total assets while market 
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leverage is the ratio of total assets minus the book value of equity to total assets minus 
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Peng and Röell (2008) argue 
that higher debt may be an indication of a firm’s poor performance of firms which could 
lead to dissatisfaction among the firm’s shareholders and, ultimately, shareholder 
litigation. Therefore, we expect the leverage to have a significant positive effect on the 
litigation probability;   
Litigation history: following the work of Gande and Lewis (2009) who show that 
firms that have a history of litigation are more likely to be sued in the future, we 
introduce this dummy variable (LIT) in our models to evaluate whether past litigous 
behavior has any significant effect on the likelihood of future litigation. Therefore, we 
assign a value of one to this variable for firms that have been sued in any time during the 
past three years prior to the litigation year and zero otherwise. As suggestd by Ertugrul 
and Hegde (2009) and Gande and Lewis (2009) we expect this variable to have a positive 
effect on litigation probability;  
Profitability: we employ three different measure of profitability (PROF) in our 
study. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as net income before taxes plus interest 
expenses divided by total assets. To ensure the robustness of our results, we also consider 
the return on equity (ROE) and the return on invested capital (ROIC) as alternative 
measures of a firm’s profitability. ROE is defined as net income before taxes plus interest 
expenses divided by the book value of equity while ROIC is defined as net income 
divided by the previous year’s total capital, i.e., the sum of the firm’s common equity, 
preferred stock, and short- and long-term debt. Similar to Gande and Lewis (2009) we 
expect profitable firms to be less likely to be sued; 
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Profitability variation: we use the three-year standard deviation of each of the 
profitability measures as a proxy for the variation in a firm’s profitability (PROF_SD). 
Specifically, we calculate three variables, namely the variation in the return on equity 
(ROE_SD), the variation in the return on assets (ROA_SD), and the variation in the return 
on invested capital (ROIC_SD). Lowry and Shu (2002) compare the characteristics of 
sued and non-sued firms and notice that the standard deviation of daily stock returns is 
significantly higher for sued firms. Thus, we expect a positive relation between these 
three variables and a firm’s litigation risk; 
Share turnover: we define share turnover (TURN) as the number of shares traded 
divided by the number of shares outstanding, based on data for one year prior to the 
litigation year. Gande and Lewis (2009) argue that an increase in share turnover increases 
the likelihood that share purchases may be driven by inaccurate information which, in 
turn, may increase a firm’s litigation risk; 
Shares held by the CEO: we calculate this variable (SHARE) by dividing the total 
number of shares held by the CEO of the company by the total number of shares 
outstanding. As the findings of Gande and Lewis (2009) suggest, the alignment of 
management and shareholders incentives can have a negative effect on the lawsuit 
probability of a firm. Therefore, we expect to observe a negative relation between this 
variable and litigation likelihood in our models; 
Stock return: we calculate a company’s stock return (RET) as the percentage stock 
return during the year prior to the litigation year. All stock prices are retrieved from 
23 
CRSP. Gande and Lewis (2009) find that prior stock returns have a significant negative 
effect on the shareholder litigation probability; 
Stock return variation: to calculate stock return variation (RET_SD), we use the 
annual standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns during the year prior to the 
litigation year. Gande and Lewis (2009) use the stock return variation as a proxy for 
purchases driven by inaccurate information and show that higher levels of this variable 
increase the firm’s litigation likelihood. 
Table 3 provides a general overview of the dependent, independent, and control 
variables we employ in this study and provides descriptions, data sources, literature 
sources, and predicted signs for each variable. Table 4 provides the same information for 
the risk management variables that we use in the construction of our risk management 
factor. 
The following section presents different regression models that we will be using 
to examine the effect of our risk management factor on a firm’s litigation probability. 
Equation (1) represents the primary model that we estimate in this study: 
ܷܵܧܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܯ_1 ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܱܲܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܴܱܲܨ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚହܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଻ܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܧܶ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܣܷܦ௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܫ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ܨܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ିଵ																																																																							ሺ1ሻ 
 This model does not exclude any of our observations. Due to data unavailability 
for some firms, including either one of our two accrual ratios in this model causes a 
reduction in the number of observations. Therefore, as a variation to our primary model, 
Equation (2) includes the accruals ratio as an additional control variable: 
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ܷܵܧܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܯ_1 ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܱܲܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܴܱܲܨ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚହܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଻ܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܧܶ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܣܷܦ௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܫ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଵܣܥܥ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܨܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ିଵ																																											ሺ2ሻ 
Since the results of our analysis do not change by including the accruals ratio we 
consider Equation (1) as the primary model in the rest of the study.  
 To ensure the robustness of our results, we also consider a model in which we add 
two additional variables to our base model, namely CEO compensation from bonuses and 
shares held by the CEO. There are two reasons why we do not include these variables in 
our primary model. First, we believe that these variables are partially represented by the 
CRO compensation variable. Second, because the information for the number of shares 
held by the CEO is not available for all the firms in our sample and control group, the 
inclusion of this variable will reduce our sample size. Equation (3) presents the model 
with these two measures as independent variables: 
ܷܵܧܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܯ_1 ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܱܲܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܴܱܲܨ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚହܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଻ܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܧܶ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܣܷܦ௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܫ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଵܵܪܣܴܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଶܤܱ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅ ܨܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ିଵ									ሺ3ሻ 
In another sensitivity test, we add the enterprise wide risk characteristics to our 
base model. As noted earlier, these variables are: aggregate risk, tail risk, and downside 
risk. The three resultant models are presented in one general form in Equation (4): 
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ܷܵܧܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܯ_1 ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܱܲܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܴܱܲܨ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚହܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଻ܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܧܶ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܣܷܦ௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܫ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଵܧܰ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ܨܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ିଵ																																											ሺ4ሻ 
   Because we employ three proxies for enterprise-wide risk, we will estimate 
multiple versions of Model 4. Model 4.a employs aggregate risk as one of the 
independent variables, model 4.b and model 4.c each use one of the two variations of tail 
risk while downside risk is included in model 4.d. Because downside risk uses the 
implied volatility of the put options written on the company’s stock as a risk measure and 
because not all firms have put options on their stock, the inclusion of this variable 
eliminates 60 observations from our data set. 
In a final robustness test, we include institutional ownership as one of the control 
variables in our analysis. Because we are unable to find institutional holdings for all firms 
in our sample and in some cases we had to ignore the observation in our sample because 
the percentage of its institutional holdings were more than 100% of the total number of 
shares outstanding due to double counting, the number of observations for this model is 
slightly less than the number of observations in our base model. Equation (5) presents our 
model with institutional ownership as a control variable: 
ܷܵܧܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܯ_1 ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܱܲܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܴܱܲܨ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚହܷܴܶ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚ଻ܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܧܶ_ܵܦ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܣܷܦ௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚଵ଴ܮܫ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଵܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ܨܧ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ିଵ																																										ሺ5ሻ 
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 In the next section, we provide summary statistics for all variables in our 
regression models and present the results for a series of univariate tests between sued and 
non-sued firms.   
    
5. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
We present summary statistics for the components of our risk management factor 
and for all control variables in Panels A and B of Table 5, respectively. The figures in 
Panel A provide some interesting insights into the risk management characteristics of the 
financial institutions in our sample.  
To provide some initial insight into the differences between the risk management 
characteristics of sued and non-sued firms, we perform a series of univariate comparison 
tests between our two subsamples. The results of our t-tests show that there are 
significant differences in the variables CRO c-suite, CRO compensation, CRO tenure, 
CRO top5, and risk committee experience between sued and non-sued financial 
institutions. The chief risk officer holds an executive position in 54.29% of all non-sued 
firms compared to 28.72% for all sued firms. The CRO’s total compensation package is 
on average 63.60% of the CEO’s total compensation package in non-sued firms but only 
46.97% in sued firms. This difference indicates that CROs have more power and 
influence in non-sued financial institutions. An alternate specification of this variable, 
i.e., a CRO compensation dummy, provides the same conclusion. The CRO tenure 
variable and its dummy counterpart indicate that CROs in non-sued firms held their 
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positions longer the CROs in sued firms. In our sample, we observe that the CRO is 
among the top five executives in 16.33% of our non-sued firms but in only 7.09% of sued 
firms.  
Even though there is no significant difference in the proportion of firms that have 
an independent risk committee between our sued and non-sued sub-sample, there is a 
statistically significant difference between the proportion of firms that have at least one 
committee member with risk management related experience. More specifically, 20.41% 
of the observations in our non-sued sample had at least one committee member with such 
experience while the proportion is 13.12% in our sued sample. This difference implies 
that although the presence of an independent risk committee is not different in our two 
samples but the experience of their members is significantly different. 
Most importantly, there is a significant difference between the mean and median 
of the risk management factor in our sued and non-sued firms’ samples. Both t-test and 
Wilcoxon test show that the differences are significant at one percent level providing 
evidence that non-sued financial firms in our sample have higher levels of risk 
management factor. 
The figures in Table 5 Panel B illustrate some significant differences between the 
firm characteristics of sued and non-sued financial institutions in our sample. The results 
of our t-tests show that there are significant differences in the variables auditor, downside 
risk, institutional ownership, litigation history, all profitability measures and the variation 
in the profitability measures, and share turnover. The results of Wilcoxon test, while 
confirming these significant differences, highlight the significant differences between 
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leverage, share ownership of the CEO, stock return, and stock return variation. Overall, 
the results suggest that on average a higher proportion of the sued firm in our sample 
were audited by one of the big four audit firms and were sued in the past. Additionally, 
an average sued firm of our sample has higher institutional shareholder ratio, lower 
performance and higher performance variability, and higher share turnover.   
In Table 6 we provide the pair-wise Pearson correlations among our independent 
variable, risk management factor, and control variables from our base model. As 
expected, firms with higher levels of risk management factor enjoy lower levels of 
lawsuit probability while share turnover, the presence of one of big four audit companies, 
and having a litigation history positively and significantly affect the litigation probability.  
The negative correlation between the risk management factor and both the stock 
return and profitability implies that implementing more rigid risk management and 
control measures could lower the short-term performance of the firm. The positive and 
significant relation between the auditor variable and our risk management factor indicates 
that firms that are audited by one of the big four audit firms have better risk management 
practices in place. There is also a significant positive correlation between share turnover 
and the risk management factor.  
Since the results presented in Table 6 are simply pair-wise correlations without 
including any control variables, we cannot make any robust conclusions regarding the 
validity of our assumptions. Therefore, in the following section, we turn our attention to 
the multivariate regressions that enable us to control for various firms characteristics in 
our sample.  
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6. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
The results of our multivariate regressions are reported in Table 7 for the prior-
year risk management factor and in Table 8 for the three-year average risk management 
factor. 
The regression results are firmly in line with our assumptions. The risk 
management variable is significantly negative at the one percent level based on either the 
one year risk management index or its three-year average. The sign suggests that firms 
that have better overall risk management practices as part of their corporate structure face 
a significantly lower probability of being sued. The results are robust when we include 
different control variables or employ different definitions of these control variables.  
The signs for our control variables are largely in line with what has been found in 
the prior literature. Litigation history is positive and significant in all of our models 
suggesting that firms that faced prior litigation are more likely to be the target of another 
lawsuit in the future. Higher profitability and market performance lowers a firm’s 
litigation risk while higher share turnover increases a firm’s litigation risk. The 
coefficients for our profitability and stock return variation variables are insignificant and 
inconsistent in their sign.  
Contrary to our expectation, firms with higher book and market leverage have a 
lower probability of being sued. This observation, although not significant, is consistent 
across all models. Similar to the findings of Gande and Lewis (2009), we observe a 
negative relation between variables that proxy for the alignment of the CEO’s and the 
shareholders’ incentives. Of these two proxies, only the CEO’s bonus compensation is 
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significant one at the ten percent level. Except for the aggregate risk variable, the signs of 
our enterprise-wide risk measures are in line with our expectations. The positive sign of 
both definitions of the tail risk measure, which Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) use as their 
main measure of enterprise-wide risk, implies that sued financial institutions experience 
higher levels of risk one year prior to the litigation.  
The coefficient for our auditor variable is insignificant in all settings but the 
positive sign in most cases provides some potential support of the deep pocket theory 
indicating that firms that use the services of these big international audit companies 
appear to face higher litigation risk because of the presence of a wealthier audit firm. The 
institutional ownership variable is positive and significant which is in line with the 
findings of Kim and Skinner (2012). This finding suggests that institutional monitoring 
may not be such an effective tool in lowering the litigation risk of financial institutions.    
 In summary, after controlling for different firm characteristics and variables that 
have been shown in the literature to have a significant effect on the probability of 
litigation, our analysis provides robust evidence of a significant negative effect of the risk 
management factor on the probability of a financial institution being sued in a securities 
class action. This finding underlines the importance of powerful risk management. 
Financial institutions that are empowered by better risk management practices (such as 
more powerful CROs and risk management committees) are less likely to become the 
target of shareholders class action lawsuits. 
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7. PREDICTIVE ABILITY 
In the last two sections, we demonstrated that our proposed risk management 
factor significantly and negatively affects the litigation probability of a firm. In order to 
test the predictive ability of our model, we run out-of-sample tests to evaluate the 
accuracy of our models in separating sued from non-sued firms. We are specifically 
interested in comparing the results of our model with a similar model that excludes the 
risk management factor.  
The tests performed here only partially show the power of the models and are not 
true tests of the predictive ability of our models. Similar to Powell (2004) we believe that 
the power of the model can only be tested in its ability to clearly flag sued firms in a 
complete population of firms. Because we are unable to calculate the risk management 
factor for all or even a representative sub-sample of financial institutions, we cannot 
perform such a test. As such, our tests only partially explore the predictive ability of our 
models. Yet, our tests results provide good preliminary indications that our model has 
better predictive ability compared to prior models that have previously been proposed in 
the literature. In addition to providing a better tool to assess the litigation probability of a 
firm, our model can be used to analyze the effectiveness of risk management measures in 
reducing the exposure of financial institutions to class action lawsuits. Therefore, they 
could be implemented as some form of risk measurement and management in financial 
institutions. 
Our test is performed in the following fashion: we take the last three years of our 
sample and perform three out-of-sample tests. For example, for the year 2011, we include 
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all observations before this year in our estimation model and use the observations of the 
year 2011 as our verification period. Then, we compare the performance of our model to 
a similar model without the risk management factor. We employ the same procedure for 
the years 2009 and 2010. We define two measures of prediction accuracy. Accuracy I is 
the ratio of the total number of correct predictions (either sued or not sued) in the 
verification year to the total number of observations in the verification year while 
Accuracy II is the number of correct predictions of sued firms in the verification year to 
the total number of sued firms in the verification year. 
Prior literature in this area (e.g., Palepu (1986) and Powell (2004)) has employed 
different methodologies for determining the cut-off point for each firm’s classification. 
Given that we employ a one-to-one matching procedure when constructing our sample, 
we can entirely avoid these discussions and assume a 50% probability as our cut-off point 
because the number of treated and non-treated firms in our data set is equal (see also 
Powell, 2004).  
Table 9 presents the variable coefficients for each of our three prediction tests 
together with our two accuracy measures for each model’s prediction in the subsequent 
year. Both accuracy measures show improvements when we add the risk management 
factor to the model. The results suggest that the addition of the risk management factor 
improves the predictive ability of the model in identifying firms that are most likely to be 
sued in the coming year. Although these results are promising we cannot draw any 
definite conclusion about the predictive power of our model without analyzing the 
performance of the model for a complete sample. 
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8. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section, we provide details of the additional robustness tests that have been 
employed to ensure the credibility of our results. Because the conclusions are not 
sensitive, either qualitatively or quantitatively, to any of these changes and for brevity of 
the presentation of the results, we do not report the results of these tests in detail.  
First, we explore the sensitivity of our conclusions to the method chosen for factor 
analysis. We employ two other methods to construct our risk management factor, namely 
Principal Factors Analysis and Maximum Likelihood Factor Analysis. PROC FACTOR 
command in SAS is used for the construction of these factors. The results are both 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results from the principal component 
analysis. This finding shows that our conclusions are not driven by the method of factor 
construction.  
Second, we consider dividing our sample into two sub-samples of firms that are 
sued due to fraudulent behavior and firms that are sued because of providing the market 
with material misinformation. The results of our base model regression on these two sub-
samples are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results from full sample. This 
finding indicates that our conclusions are not driven by the type of litigation in our 
sample. 
Third, we construct alternative risk management factors in order to ensure the 
insensitivity of our conclusions to the underlying variables of the risk management factor. 
First, we construct a risk management factor without including CRO tenure variable 
(TEN) because we are concerned that the inclusion of this variable may simply capture a 
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time trend in our models and biases our conclusions. Second, we change the definition of 
three of our underlying risk management variables and transform them into dummy 
variables. These three new variables are CRO compensation dummy which takes on a 
value of one if the ratio of the CRO’s to the CEO’s total compensation package is above 
the average of all financial institutions in our sample (COMP = 1) and zero otherwise 
(COMP = 0), risk committee meetings dummy which takes on the value of one if the risk 
committee meeting frequency is equal to or more than the average number of risk 
committee meetings across all financial institutions in our sample (COMMITTEE_MEET 
= 1) and zero otherwise (COMMITTEE_MEET = 0), and CRO tenure dummy which 
takes on a value of one if the financial institution introduced its first CRO earlier than the 
average of all financial institutions in our sample (TEN = 1) and zero otherwise (TEN = 
0). The results for these alternative definitions of our risk management factor are similar 
both in terms of sign and significance which ensures us of the robustness of our 
conclusions based on the base definition of our risk management factor.  
 
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In recent years, a variety of legislative and regulatory bodies have pressured 
financial firms to improve their risk governance structures to better weather any potential 
future crises. Assuming that CROs are given sufficient power to influence the corporate 
governance of financial institutions, can they provide these firms with the promised 
benefits? In this study, we aim to answer this question by comparing the risk 
management in sued versus non-sued financial institutions. To perform this comparison, 
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we manually collect risk management characteristics of 85 sued and 85 non-sued 
financial firms that have banking-related operations as their main line of business and, 
using principal component analysis, construct a single risk management factor which 
captures most of the variations in these characteristics. By including this new variable in 
models proposed in the previous literature, we provide evidence of a significant negative 
impact of the prior year and three-year average risk management factor on litigation 
probability. To further reinforce our proposition, we perform a series of out-of-sample 
tests and show that the addition of this risk management factor to previously established 
models improves the overall accuracy of these models in identifying companies that are 
most susceptible to class action lawsuits. Overall, our results suggest that the litigation 
exposure of financial institutions can be reduced by putting stronger and more 
independent risk management functions in place.  
 
10. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Aside from expansion possibilities such as performing this study in industries 
other than the financial sector and focusing on a different sample of lawsuits (such as IPO 
cases) we propose the following extensions to our study: 
 First, it would be interesting to look at the stockholders’ reaction to litigation 
announcements. Do investors penalize firms with better risk management structures in 
the same fashion as their peers with poor risk governance? Performing this study could 
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shed some light on the ex-post effects of establishing strong risk management practices in 
financial institutions. 
 Throughout this study we did not account for variations in lawsuit characteristics 
or their outcomes. As a second possible extension to this study, it may thus be interesting 
to analyze subsets of our sample based on lawsuits’ characteristics such as the presence 
of an accountant as a co-defendant, an institutional lead plaintiff, or lawsuit outcomes 
(e.g., settlements vs. dismissals). This would shed some light on the ex-post effects of 
risk management checks and balances. 
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Table 1: Litigation trend  
 This table provides information on the number of litigation cases for all financial firms (firms with one-digit SIC codes of 6) 
and financial firms included in our final sample which are firms with banking-related operations as their main line of business (firms 
with four-digit SIC codes of 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, and 6036) between 1996 and 2011. In the last three rows, we report information 
on the total number of litigation cases as well as yearly means and medians. 
   
Year Filings for All Financial Firms  Filings for Financial Firms in the Final Sample 
1996 7 0 
1997 15 0 
1998 14 0 
1999 18 3 
2000 25 1 
2001 13 2 
2002 31 5 
2003 43 6 
2004 34 5 
2005 25 5 
2006 12 1 
2007 43 10 
2008 79 18 
2009 36 10 
2010 20 11 
2011 14 8 
Total 429 85 
Average 27 7 
Median 23 5 
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Table 2: Litigation breakdown by industry 
 This table provides information on the yearly number of litigation cases for financial firms included in our final sample 
between 1999 and 2011. Our sample includes 85 firms with SIC codes of 6021 (national commercial banks), 6022 (state commercial 





6021 6022 6029 6035 6036
1999 3 ― ― ― ― 
2000 1 ― ― ― ― 
2001 1 ― ― 1 ― 
2002 3 ― 1 ― 1 
2003 2 3 ― ― 1 
2004 3 ― 1 ― 1 
2005 3 2 ― ― ― 
2006 1 ― ― ― ― 
2007 2 4 1 3 ― 
2008 12 6 ― ― ― 
2009 6 4 ― ― ― 
2010 2 8 ― 1 ― 
2011 4 4 ― ― ― 
Total 43 31 3 5 3 
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Table 3: Risk management variables description 
This table provides descriptions and data sources of our risk management variables. These variables are used in our principal 
component analysis to construct the risk management factor. 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Data Source(s) 
XP 
This variable equals one if the firm’s CRO has risk-related 
experience and zero otherwise 
Edgar 
TEN 








This variable equals one if the firm’s CRO is one of the top five 
paid executives of the firm and zero otherwise 
Edgar 
COMP 
This variable equals the ratio of the CRO’s total compensation 
package to the CEO’s total compensation package 
Edgar and  
Compustat ExecuComp 
REP 
This variable equals one if the CRO has a direct reporting line to 
the board of directors and zero otherwise 
Edgar 
COMMITTEE 
This variable equals one if there is a designated committee among 
the board committees that is responsible for managing and 
monitoring risk and zero otherwise 
Edgar 
COMMITTEE_XP 
This variable equals one if at least one of the risk committee 
directors has risk-related experience and zero otherwise 
Edgar 
COMMITTEE_MEET 
This variable equals the number of risk committee meetings 
throughout the year 
Edgar 
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Table 4: Dependent and independent variables description 
 This table describes our dependent, independent, and control variables and provides data sources, literature sources, and 
predicted signs for each variable. Year t denotes the litigation filing year.  
 





Dependent variable  
SUEDt 
This variable equals one if the firm was the 
defendant in a class action lawsuit in the 1999-





Independent variables  
RMt-1 
This factor is the single factor from a principal 
component analysis with the highest eigenvalue 
that can explain most of the variations in the 
factors underlying risk management 
Edgar (10-K statements, 
proxy statements, and 






Control variables  
PROFt-1 
Return on equity: net income before taxes plus 
interest expenses divided by the book value of 
equity 
Return on assets: net income before taxes plus 
interest expenses divided by total assets  
Return on invested capital: net income divided 
by the previous year’s total capital which is 
defined as the sum of common equity, preferred 








      Table 4 – Continued 






Three-year standard deviation of annual 
profitability 
Compustat 




Book leverage: total assets minus book value of 
equity divided by total assets  
Market leverage: ratio of total assets minus 
book value of equity to total assets minus book 
value of equity plus market value of equity 
Compustat 




Aggregate risk: standard deviation of the firm’s 
weekly return minus S&P 500’s weekly return  
Tail risk I: negative of firm’s average return 
during 5% days that S&P 500 recorded the 
poorest returns 
Tail risk II: negative of the average return of the 
firm during the 5% days that the stock itself 
recorded its worst performance 
Downside risk: average implied volatility of the 
put options sold on the firm’s stock 
CRSP and OptionMetrics ― + 
TURNt-1 
Number of shares traded divided by total 
number of shares outstanding calculated for one 






Total accruals: income before extraordinary 
items minus operating cash flows minus cash 
flows from investment to total assets 
Operating accruals: ratio of income before 
extraordinary items minus operating cash flows 
to total assets 
Compustat 
Peng and Röell 
(2008) 
+ 
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      Table 4 – Continued 






Percentage stock return during the year prior to 






Annualized standard deviation of daily stock 
returns during the year prior to the litigation 
year 
CRSP 




This variable equals one if the firm’s auditor is 
one of the big four audit firms (i.e., 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, 








Ratio of CEO bonuses to the CEO’s total 
compensation 
Edgar (10-K statements, 
proxy statements, and 






Total number of shares held by the CEO 







This variable equals one for firms that have 
been sued in any time during the past three 









Ratio of the number of shares held by 
institutional shareholders at the end of the year 
to the total number of shares outstanding 
Thomson Financial 






Table 5: Summary statistics 
 This table provides summary statistics and univariate comparison tests for all firms in our sample and control group. Panel A 
presents summary statistics for our risk management factor and its components while Panel B presents statistics for our control 
variables. Specifically, we report information on the mean, median, standard deviation (St. Dev.), 1st quartile (Q1), and 3rd quartile 
(Q3) of each variable in our sub-sample of sued and non-sued firms. Significance levels are computed for the difference in means 
(medians) using a t-test (Wilcoxon two-sided t-test) and are indicated by *, **, and *** which denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for risk management factor and its components  
 
















RM_1Y 0.0231 0.4348*** -0.0321 0.2432*** 1.3718 1.6136 -0.7901 -0.8512 0.9911 1.4321 
SUITE 0.2872 0.5429*** 0 1*** 0.4533 0.4992 0 1 1 1 
COMP 0.4697 0.6360*** 0.3822 0.4618*** 0.5993 0.7481 0.2238 0.3026 0.5410 0.6647 
XP 0.0461 0.0490 0 0 0.2101 0.2163 0 0 0 0 
REP 0.0106 0.0245 0 0 0.1028 0.1549 0 0 0 0 
TEN 0.8688 1.9429*** 0 0 1.9016 4.6152 0 0 0 2 
TOP5 0.0709 0.1633*** 0 1*** 0.2572 0.3704 0 0 0 1 
COMMITTEE 0.5461 0.5061 1 1 0.4988 0.5010 0 0 1 1 
COMMITTEE_XP 0.1312 0.2041** 0 0 0.3382 0.4039 0 0 0 0 
COMMITTEE_MEET 2.1277 2.0816 0 0 2.9848 3.3476 0 0 4 6 
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    Panel B: Summary statistics for control variables 
 
















ACC_TT 0.0393 0.0160 0.0461 0.0323 0.1155 0.0812 -0.0270 -0.0232 0.1002 0.0805 
ACC_OP -0.0067 -0.004 -0.0086 -0.0068 0.0563 0.0535 -0.0298 -0.0158 0.0070 0.0049 
BON 0.1884 0.2523 0 0 0.2924 0.3359 0.5186 0 0.3194 0 
AUD 0.6067 0.4500** 1 0** 0.4912 0.5006 1 0 1 0 
ENT_AGG 0.1109 0.1283 0.0636 0.0680 0.1558 0.1876 0.0447 0.0428 0.1125 0.1067 
ENT_TAIL_I -0.0353 -0.0292 -0.0291 -0.0241 0.0280 0.0201 -0.0427 -0.0328 -0.0182 -0.0169 
ENT_TAIL_II -0.0659 -0.0668 -0.0558 -0.0569 0.0276 0.0281 -0.0913 -0.0924 -0.0485 -0.0455 
ENT_DOWN 0.5168 0.4185** 0.3853 0.3574** 0.2880 0.1866 0.3291 0.2801 0.7017 0.4754 
INST 0.5679 0.4722*** 0.5755 0.4963*** 0.2262 0.2182 0.4529 0.3080 0.7035 0.6253 
LEV_B 0.9069 0.9081 0.9175 0.9058*** 0.0926 0.0216 0.9065 0.8983 0.9367 0.9223 
LEV_M 0.8643 0.8532 0.9018 0.8710*** 0.1443 0.0899 0.8514 0.8161 0.9385 0.9039 
LIT 0.3371 0.1125*** 0 0 0.4754 0.3180 1 0 1 0 
ROE 0.0925 0.2433** 0.1680 0.2255*** 0.7125 0.2029 0.0788 0.1487 0.3206 0.2993 
ROA 0.0158 0.0206** 0.0150 0.0198*** 0.0306 0.0133 0.0054 0.0127 0.0269 0.0261 
ROIC 0.0054 0.0347** 0.0213 0.0362*** 0.1001 0.0427 -0.0135 0.0153 0.0502 0.0515 
ROE_SD 0.1024 0.0622** 0.0677 0.0479*** 0.3834 0.0673 0.0297 0.0221 0.1272 0.0768 
ROA_SD 0.0101 0.0075** 0.0067 0.0043*** 0.0129 0.0231 0.0024 0.0019 0.0117 0.0069 
ROIC_SD 0.1022 0.0462** 0.0563 0.0332*** 0.1120 0.0609 0.0683 0.0223 0.1328 0.0627 
TURN 2.2677 1.4193*** 1.7047 1.1179*** 1.9682 1.4159 0.8914 0.6018 2.9965 1.6393 
SHARE 0.0079 0.0063 0.0009 0.0015** 0.0298 0.0102 0.0004 0.0008 0.0030 0.0069 
RET -0.1825 -0.0923 -0.1801 -0.0964** 0.4092 0.3790 -0.5266 -0.2869 0.0624 0.1299 
RET_SD 0.3091 0.2856 0.2894 0.2215** 0.1833 0.3037 0.2038 0.1268 0.3834 0.3714 
49 
Table 6: Correlation matrix 
This table shows the correlation matrix for our dependent variable, risk management factor, and control variables included in 
our base regression model (i.e., model 1). The numbers below the main diagonal are the Pearson correlations. The SUED dummy 
takes the value of one if the firm was the defendant in a class action lawsuit in the 1999-2011 period, and zero otherwise. The risk 
management factor (RM_1Y) is the single factor from principal component analysis with the highest eigenvalue that can explain most 
of the variation in our risk management proxies. Profitability (PROF) is net income before taxes plus interest expense divided by total 
assets. Profitability variation (PROF_SD) is the three-year standard deviation of the firm’s annual profitability. Leverage (LEV) is 
calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity divided by total assets. Share turnover (TURN) is the number of shares traded 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding calculated based on data for one year prior to the litigation year. Stock return (RET) 
is the percentage stock return during the year prior to the litigation year. Stock return variation (RET_SD) is the annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock returns. The auditor variable (AUD) is a dummy variable that differentiates between firms that are audited by 
one of the big four audit firms (i.e., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG) and firms that employ 
some other audit firms. Litigation history (LIT) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for firms that have been sued in any 
time during the past three years prior to the litigation year and zero otherwise. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** which 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
           
 SUED RM_1Y PROF PROF_SD LEV TURN RET RET_SD AUD LIT 
SUED 1          
RM_1Y -0.3313*** 1         
PROF -0.0992 -0.0766* 1        
PROF_SD 0.0723 -0.1222 -0.2262*** 1       
LEV -0.0092 0.0461 -0.4724*** 0.0261 1      
TURN 0.2393*** 0.3580*** -0.2474*** 0.1647** 0.0112 1     
RET -0.1133 -0.0962* 0.2097*** -0.1960** 0.0058 -0.3110*** 1    
RET_SD 0.0477 -0.1228 -0.0707 0.5251*** -0.0603 0.0209 -0.1572** 1   
AUD 0.1569** 0.3403*** -0.0261 0.0612 -0.0489 0.4912*** -0.0898 -0.0212 1  
LIT 0.2661*** 0.4455*** 0.0641 -0.0270 0.0653 0.2167*** -0.1441* -0.0495 0.2880*** 1 
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Table 7: Multivariate regression results for one year lagged risk management factor 
This table provides regression results for a series of models in which we consider one year lagged risk management factor and 
accounting data. Our risk management factor (RM_1Y) is the single factor from principal component analysis with the highest 
eigenvalue that can explain most of the variation in our risk management proxies. The total accruals ratio (ACC_TT) is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows to total assets. CEO bonus compensation (BON) is the ratio of the 
CEO’s compensation from bonuses to the CEO’s total compensation. The auditor variable (AUD) is a dummy variable that 
differentiates between firms that are audited by one of the big four audit firms (i.e., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, 
Ernst & Young, and KPMG) and firms that employ some other audit firms. Aggregate risk (ENT_AGG) is the standard deviation of 
the firm’s weekly return minus the S&P 500’s weekly return. Tail risk I (ENT_TAIL_I) is the negative of the firm’s average return 
during the 5% of days on which the S&P 500 recorded its poorest returns while Tail risk II (ENT_TAIL_II) is the negative of the 
average return of the firm during the 5% of days on which the stock itself recorded its worst performance. Downside risk 
(ENT_DOWN) is defined as the average implied volatility of the put options written on the firm’s stock. Institutional ownership 
(INST) is the ratio of the number of shares held by institutional shareholders at the end of the year to the total number of shares 
outstanding. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity divided by total assets. Litigation history 
(LIT) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for firms that have been sued in any time during the past three years prior to the 
litigation year and zero otherwise. Profitability (PROF) is net income before taxes plus interest expense divided by total assets. 
Profitability variation (PROF_SD) is the three-year standard deviation of the firm’s annual profitability. Share turnover (TURN) is the 
number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding calculated based on data for one year prior to the litigation 
year. Shares held by the CEO is (SHARE) defined as the total number of shares held by the CEO divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. Stock return (RET) is the percentage stock return during the year prior to the litigation year. Stock return variation 
(RET_SD) is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** which denote 







Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4.a Model 4.b Model 4.c Model 4.d Model 5 
RM_1Y -0.1651*** -0.1375*** -0.1324*** -0.1665*** -0.1706*** -0.1695*** -0.1297*** -0.1693*** 
ACC_TT — 0.0225 — — — — — — 
BON — — -0.4205* — — — — — 
AUD -0.0056 0.1389 -0.0105 0.0030 0.0596 0.0825 0.0151 0.0277 
ENT_AGG — — — -0.1704 — — — — 
ENT_TAIL_I — — — — 0.2174 — — — 
ENT_TAIL_II — — — — — 1.9295 — — 
ENT_DOWN — — — — — — 0.0609 — 
INST — — — — — — — 0.3172* 
LEV -0.6067 -0.9614 -0.2195 -0.5990 -0.6221 -0.5338 -0.5483 -0.5024 
LIT 0.3576*** 0.3775*** 0.3013** 0.3860*** 0.3492*** 0.3458*** 0.3612*** 0.3612*** 
PROF -2.6941 -4.5356* -0.7066 -2.8540 -3.1598 -3.2161* -1.2274 -2.6075 
PROF_SD -0.3662 -2.3683 8.1459 -0.3964 -0.3728 -0.5156 4.1125 -0.0088 
TURN 0.0575** 0.0464* 0.0436 0.0438* 0.0391 0.0458* 0.0161 0.0468 
SHARE — — -1.3222 — — — — — 
RET -0.0175 -0.0357 -0.0356 -0.0306 -0.0030 -0.0202 -0.0528 0.0253 
RET_SD 0.0241 0.0363 0.5309 0.0573 0.0313 0.0106 0.3314 -0.0559 
Adjusted R2 10.98% 12.62% 10.99% 9.79% 10.22% 11.10% 8.57% 12.13% 
F-value 2.99*** 2.65*** 2.13** 2.62*** 2.61*** 2.77*** 1.95** 2.81*** 
N 170 128 150 166 158 158 112 144 
 
52 
Table 8: Multivariate regression results for three-year average risk management factor 
This table provides regression results for a series of models in which we consider three-year average risk management factor 
and accounting data. Our risk management factor (RM_3Y) is the single factor from principal component analysis with the highest 
eigenvalue that can explain most of the variation in our risk management proxies. The total accruals ratio (ACC_TT) is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows to total assets. CEO bonus compensation (BON) is the ratio of the 
CEO’s compensation from bonuses to the CEO’s total compensation. The auditor variable (AUD) is a dummy variable that 
differentiates between firms that are audited by one of the big four audit firms (i.e., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, 
Ernst & Young, and KPMG) and firms that employ some other audit firms. Aggregate risk (ENT_AGG) is the standard deviation of 
the firm’s weekly return minus the S&P 500’s weekly return. Tail risk I (ENT_TAIL_I) is the negative of the firm’s average return 
during the 5% of days on which the S&P 500 recorded its poorest returns while Tail risk II (ENT_TAIL_II) is the negative of the 
average return of the firm during the 5% of days on which the stock itself recorded its worst performance. Downside risk 
(ENT_DOWN) is defined as the average implied volatility of the put options written on the firm’s stock. Institutional ownership 
(INST) is the ratio of the number of shares held by institutional shareholders at the end of the year to the total number of shares 
outstanding. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity divided by total assets. Litigation history 
(LIT) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for firms that have been sued in any time during the past three years prior to the 
litigation year and zero otherwise. Profitability (PROF) is net income before taxes plus interest expense divided by total assets. 
Profitability variation (PROF_SD) is the three-year standard deviation of the firm’s annual profitability. Share turnover (TURN) is the 
number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding calculated based on data for one year prior to the litigation 
year. Shares held by the CEO is (SHARE) defined as the total number of shares held by the CEO divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. Stock return (RET) is the percentage stock return during the year prior to the litigation year. Stock return variation 
(RET_SD) is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** which denote 








Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4.a Model 4.b Model 4.c Model 4.d Model 5 
RM_3Y -0.1676*** -0.1598*** -0.1356** -0.1719*** -0.1660*** -0.1639*** -0.1291** -0.1112*** 
ACC — 1.3087 — — — — — — 
BON — — -0.0086 — — — — — 
AUD -0.0156 0.0625 0.0684 -0.0276 -0.0411 -0.0284 0.0024 0.0292 
ENT_AGG — — — -0.3484 — — — — 
ENT_TAIL_I — — — — 1.0310 — — — 
ENT_TAIL_II — — — — — 1.8483 — — 
ENT_DOWN — — — — — — 0.1853 — 
INST — — — — — — — 0.1974** 
LEV -0.7729 -1.4765* 0.0944 -0.6856 -0.9743 -0.9683 0.0600 -0.5305 
LIT 0.3325*** 0.3803*** 0.2979** 0.3236*** 0.2811 0.2834** 0.3203** 0.3767*** 
PROF -1.2941 -4.6275 0.5115 -1.5703 -2.3823 -2.5072 0.1376 -2.5976 
PROF_SD 0.0474 -1.9597 10.4149 -1.0755 -0.4869 -0.4393 2.0210 0.7248 
TURN 0.0721* 0.0739* -0.0002 0.0956** 0.1085** 0.1063** 0.0003 0.0768** 
SHARE — — -2.2784 — — — — — 
RET -0.1713 -0.0542 -0.7007* -0.2430 -0.1661 -0.2026 -0.6060 0.0706 
RET_SD -0.0054 0.0196 0.7076* 0.0688 -0.0850 -0.1020 0.4615 -0.1451 
Adjusted R2 10.62% 10.94% 11.54% 11.90% 10.30% 10.56% 9.33% 11.87% 
F-value 2.83*** 2.41*** 2.13** 2.85*** 2.49*** 2.53*** 1.95** 2.81*** 
N 170 128 104 152 144 144 102 140 
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Table 9: Predictive ability of models with/without the risk management factor 
 This table provides information on the predictive ability of our model with the risk management factor as one of the 
independent variables and compares it with the corresponding model without that factor. Our risk management factor (RM_1Y) is the 
single factor from principal component analysis with the highest eigenvalue that can explain most of the variation in our risk 
management proxies. The auditor variable (AUD) is a dummy variable that differentiates between firms that are audited by one of the 
big four audit firms (i.e., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG) and firms that employ some other 
audit firms. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity divided by total assets. Litigation history (LIT) 
is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for firms that have been sued in any time during the past three years prior to the 
litigation year and zero otherwise. Profitability (PROF) is net income before taxes plus interest expense divided by total assets. 
Profitability variation (PROF_SD) is the three-year standard deviation of the firm’s annual profitability. Share turnover (TURN) is the 
number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding calculated based on data for one year prior to the litigation 
year. Stock return (RET) is the percentage stock return during the year prior to the litigation year. Stock return variation (RET_SD) is 
the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns. Accuracy I is the ratio of total number of correct predictions (either sued or 
not sued) to the total number of observations while Accuracy II is the number of correct predictions of sued firms to the total number 
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RM_1Y -0.1299** — -0.1150** — -0.1063** — 
AUD 0.0748 0.0752 -0.0504 -0.0365 -0.0458 -0.0378 
LEV -1.0864 -1.0862 -1.4759* -1.4652* -1.3148 -1.2202 
LIT 0.3914*** 0.3112** 0.3934** 0.2991** 0.4043** 0.3042* 
PROF -4.2308 -4.0004 -4.5634 -4.2111 -3.6708 -3.0838 
PROF_SD -1.8122 -1.2396 -0.0425 0.2085 -0.7990 -1.1094 
SHARE 0.0473* 0.0354 0.0890** 0.0806** 0.1134** 0.1114** 
RET -0.0661 -0.0588 0.0498 0.0588 0.2740 0.2864 
RET_SD 0.0171 0.0366 -0.1195 -0.0839 -0.1145 -0.0472 
Accuracy I 64.28% 57.14% 58.33% 50% 80.95% 71.43% 
Accuracy II 62.5% 50% 50% 41.67% 90.91% 81.81% 
 
